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Abstract
A challenging unsolved security problem is how to spec-
ify and enforce system-wide security policies; this problem
is even more acute in distributed systems with mutual dis-
trust. This paper describes a way to enforce policies for
data conﬁdentiality and integrity in such an environment.
Programs annotated with security speciﬁcations are stati-
cally checked and then transformed by the compiler to run
securely on a distributed system with untrusted hosts. The
code and data of the computation are partitioned across
the available hosts in accordance with the security speci-
ﬁcation. The key contribution is automatic replication of
code and data to increase assurance of integrity—without
harming conﬁdentiality, and without placing undue trust
in any host. The compiler automatically generates secure
run-time protocols for communication among the replicated
code partitions. Results are given from a prototype imple-
mentation applied to various distributed programs.
1 Introduction
Computing systems are becomingmore complex and yet
we increasingly depend on them to function correctly and
securely. Unfortunately, it is currently difﬁcult to make
strong statements about the security provided by a comput-
ing system as a whole. Distributed systems make security
assurance particularly difﬁcult, as these systems naturally
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cross administrative and trust boundaries; typically, some
of the participants in a distributed computation do not trust
other participants or the computing software and hardware
they provide. Systemsmeeting this description include clin-
ical and ﬁnancial information systems, business-to-business
transactions, and joint military information systems. These
systems are distributed precisely because they serve the in-
terests of mutually distrusting principals.
The open question is how programmers should build
distributed systems that properly enforce strong security
policies for data conﬁdentiality and integrity. In partic-
ular, we are interested in policies based on information
ﬂow (e.g., [16, 49, 57, 26]), which are attractive because
they constrain the behavior of the whole system. Informa-
tion ﬂow policies are an end-to-end speciﬁcation of com-
puter security, unlike (discretionary) access control, which
does not track information propagation.
Recently, secure program partitioning [61] has been pro-
posed as a way to solve this problem. The Jif/split compiler
automatically partitions high-level, non-distributed code
into distributed subprograms that run securely on a collec-
tion of host machines that are trusted to varying degrees
by the participating principals. (Such hosts are heteroge-
neously trusted.) A partitioning is secure if the security of
a principal can be harmed only by the hosts the principal
trusts. Thus, the partitioning of the source program is driven
by a high-level speciﬁcation of security policies and trust.
This work shows how to use replication to protect the
integrity of program data and control information in the se-
cure partitioning framework. Earlier work on secure par-
titioning found that integrity is a crucial aspect of system
security, especially when trying to enforce complex, data-
dependent security policies. Replication makes it easier to
provide integrity because replicated data and computations
can be checked against each other to ensure they agree.
This is a well-known way to increase integrity assurance,
used in ﬁle systems and replicated state machines (e.g.,
[40, 23, 7, 47]); what has not been previously investigated
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is how to apply it to general computation in a system with
mutual distrust.
Applying replication to secure program partitioning en-
ables a broader class of applications to be automatically
compiled for distributed systems with heterogeneously
trusted hosts. But in this context, replication creates sev-
eral new problems that this paper addresses:
 Trust is heterogeneous, unlike in the traditional appli-
cations of replication to fault tolerance. Therefore the
replication of computation and data must vary from
host to host, as determined by trust and security poli-
cies.
 Replication makes conﬁdentiality policies harder to
enforce, because it creates more copies of the data po-
tentially vulnerable to attack. In our system, secure
hash replicas are automatically generated to ensure in-
tegrity without violating conﬁdentiality.
 For efﬁciency, replicated computation is performed
concurrently. Therefore a suitable concurrency-control
mechanism is needed for heterogeneously trusted
hosts.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
gives some background on secure program partitioning, de-
scribing the security model and showing how programs are
written using this model. Section 3 explains how programs
are statically partitioned and replicated according to secu-
rity constraints. Section 4 describes the run-time mech-
anisms that ensure the assumptions of the static analysis
hold. The implementation of this approach and experience
with it are discussed in Section 5, along with some perfor-
mance results. Sections 6 and 7 conclude the paper with a
discussion of related approaches, limitations of the existing
system, and future work.
2 Programming and Security Models
2.1 Secure program partitioning
In the secure program partitioning approach, the desired
computation is expressed as a non-distributed program con-
taining security annotations. These annotations are used to
check at compile time that the program does not contain
disallowed information ﬂows. The splitter, a back end to
the compiler, also uses these program security annotations,
along with information about the degree to which principals
trust the available hosts, to construct a ﬁne-grained secure
partitioning of the program code and data onto these hosts.
Computations that would ordinarily be written as sep-
arate programs communicating over the network can be
written as a single program; based on security considera-
tions, the splitter automatically generates the separate sub-
programs and discovers a network protocol that they may
use to communicate. The splitter operates automatically,
but it may be given constraints and hints, for example to
improve performance. It is not necessary to give the split-
ter the entire program at once; program code may be sep-
arately compiled. The use of explicit constraints and sepa-
rate compilation can be useful for programmers who wish
to partition their code by hand. In this usage the compiler
and splitter serve to verify that the manual partitioning is
secure.
An alternative approach to building secure distributed
programs would be to start from a lower-level distributed
program and add annotations that permit the program to be
shown secure. However, secure program partitioning has
some important advantages. First, the programmer need
not be aware of the distributed protocols that are needed to
ensure strong security properties. Second, it is not known
how to annotate a program containing these complex pro-
tocols in a way that permits accurate determination of in-
formation ﬂow. The closest existing work—on information
ﬂow in concurrent systems with a trusted execution plat-
form [45, 52, 39, 6, 24, 19, 33]—has produced restrictive
analyses that rule out many practical programs. We expect
that dealing with mutual distrust would only exacerbate the
problem. By contrast, secure program partitioning starts
from a simpler, higher-level description of the computation
and can be less restrictive because its security analysis has
more information to work with.
This work is concerned with the control of informa-
tion ﬂow, including covert storage channels such as implicit
ﬂows [9]. We do not treat covert channels based on termi-
nation and timing, though some ongoing work partially ad-
dresses timing channels [1, 37]. In addition, our prototype
implementation does not attempt to prevent certain trafﬁc
analysis attacks. Although all communication is suitably
encrypted, an attacker could learn information based on the
pattern of that communication. Adding dummymessages is
one possible way to protect against these attacks [20, 2].
In this work the trusted computing base is the same as in
the secure program partitioning work [61]; for example, it
includes the Jif compiler and the splitter. However, a trusted
host is not needed to perform the compilation and splitting
of the program.
2.2 Security labels
The programs to be partitioned are written in the pro-
gramming language Jif [29], which extends the Java lan-
guage [48] with security annotations. Jif programs contain
labels based on the decentralized label model [30], in which
principals can express ownership of information-ﬂow poli-
cies. This model works well for systems incorporating mu-
tual distrust, because labels specify on whose behalf the
security policy operates. In particular, label ownership is
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used to control the use of selective declassiﬁcation [34], a
feature needed for realistic applications of information-ﬂow
control.
In this model, a principal is an entity (e.g., user, pro-
cess) that can have a security concern. These concerns are
expressed as labels, which state conﬁdentiality or integrity
policies that apply to the labeled data. Principals can be
named in these policies as owners of policies and as readers
of data.
A security label specifying conﬁdentiality is written
as {o:r
1
,r
2
,...,r
n
}, meaning that the labeled data is
owned by principal o, and that o permits the data to be read
by principals r
1
through r
n
(and, implicitly, o). A label is
a security policy controlling the uses of the data it labels;
only the owner has the right to weaken this policy. A secu-
rity label specifying integrity is written as {*:p
1
,...,p
n
},
meaning that principals p
1
through p
n
trust the data—they
believe the data to be computed by the program as writ-
ten. This is a weak notion of integrity; its purpose is to
protect security-critical information from damage by sub-
verted hosts. Labels combining integrity and conﬁdential-
ity arise naturally; for example, the label {*:p
1
; p
1
:p
2
}
indicates that the labeled data is trusted by principal p
1
and
also owned by p
1
, and only p
2
is permitted to read it.
Labels on data create restrictions on the use of that data.
The use of high-conﬁdentiality data is restricted to prevent
information leaks, and the use of low-integrity data is re-
stricted to prevent information corruption. The label on in-
formation may be securely changed from label L
1
to label
L
2
if L
2
speciﬁes at least as much conﬁdentiality as L
1
,
and at most as much integrity as L
1
. We write this label re-
lationship as L
1
v L
2
. The relation v is a pre-order whose
equivalence classes form a distributive lattice [30]; the lat-
tice join and meet operations are t and u respectively.
The join operation combines the restrictions on how data
may be used. For example, if x has label L
x
and y has label
L
y
, then x + y has label L
x
tL
y
, which preserves restric-
tions on the use of x and y. Dually, the label L
x
uL
y
is at
most as restrictive asL
x
orL
y
; thus, it must describe at least
as much integrity as either label. This makes sense because
labels represent restrictions on how data may be used; data
with higher integrity has fewer restrictions on its use [4].
For any label (or program expression) x, the notations
C(x) and I(x) refer respectively to the conﬁdentiality and
integrity parts of x (or the label of x).
2.3 The Jif programming language
Variables and expressions in Jif have types that may
include security labels. For example, a value with type
int{o:r} is an integer owned by principal o and readable
by r. When unlabeled Java types are written, the label com-
ponent is automatically inferred from the uses of the data.
Every program expression has a labeled type that is an
upper bound (with respect to thev order) on the security of
the data represented by the expression. Jif’s type-checking
algorithm prevents labeled information from being down-
graded, or assigned a less-restrictive label (i.e., lower in the
lattice). In general, downgrading results in a loss of con-
ﬁdentiality or a spurious increase in claimed integrity. The
type system tracks data dependencies (information ﬂows) to
prevent unintentional downgrading.
Implicit ﬂows [9] are information ﬂows through the con-
trol structure of the program. Implicit ﬂows can create
both integrity and conﬁdentiality concerns. For example,
control-ﬂow integrity is important: if untrusted parties can
affect the control ﬂow of the program, they might cause a
security violation. Security policies on control ﬂow are ex-
pressed as labels, just as for ordinary variables. For each
program point pc, two special labels C(pc) and I(pc) are
computed statically, representing the conﬁdentiality and in-
tegrity policies applying to the control ﬂow at that point.
A Jif programmermay annotate a programwith arbitrary
security labels, but this does not mean that the program-
mer has control over security. First, if labels are not inter-
nally consistent the program will not type-check; second,
labels must also be consistent with the security policies on
data in the external environment that the program interacts
with. External consistency is checked partly at link time
and partly at run time.
Strict information-ﬂow policies based on noninterfer-
ence [16] have not been successful in practice as they
are very restrictive. Jif supports two operators for inten-
tionally downgrading security policies, declassify and
endorse. Declassiﬁcation reduces conﬁdentiality require-
ments and endorsement (dually) increases the claimed in-
tegrity of data. To downgrade a security label, code must be
granted the authority of the principals whose security poli-
cies are affected. For declassiﬁcation, these principals are
the owners of the conﬁdentiality policies that are weakened;
for integrity, these are the principals newly appearing in the
integrity part of the label.
A second restriction on downgrading is that it is only
permitted at a point where the program counter label indi-
cates that the affected principals trust program control ﬂow.
This requirement prevents the downgrading decision from
being improperly affected by untrustworthy data or com-
putation. The goal is to enforce the robust declassiﬁcation
property [59].
This work inherits some of the limitations of Jif. The
most important is that programs are sequential; the Java
Thread class is not available. This rules out an important
class of timing channels whose control is an open research
area [24, 44, 45].
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1 int{Alice:; *:Alice,Bob} bid;
2 boolean{Alice:Bob; *:Alice,Bob} isCommitted;
3
4 void commit{Alice:Bob; *:Alice,Bob}
5 (int{Alice:; *:Alice} v)
6 where authority (Bob)
7 {
8 v = (v>=0) ? v : 0;
9 if (!isCommitted) {
10 bid = endorse(v, {*:Alice,Bob});
11 isCommitted = true;
12 }
13 }
14 int{Alice:Bob; *:Alice,Bob} reveal{*:Alice,Bob} ()
15 where authority (Alice)
16 {
17 if (isCommitted)
18 return declassify(bid, {Alice:Bob});
19 else return -1;
20 }
Figure 1. Bid commitment program
2.4 Bid commitment example
Figure 1 shows an example of a Jif program based on
the well-known Bit Commitment Protocol [5]. Instead of
committing a bit, the program commits a non-negative inte-
ger. The principal Alice commits a bid v to a principal Bob
without revealing the bid. Later, Alice reveals v and Bob
veriﬁes that it is the bid Alice previously committed. We
chose this example because it is short but has interesting
security issues.
Alice’s committed bid is represented by the ﬁeld bid.
Its label {Alice:; *:Alice,Bob} indicates that this ﬁeld
is owned (and can be read) only by Alice, and that both
Alice and Bob trust it to be the committed bid. The boolean
isCommitted records whether Alice has committed a bid
yet; it must be trusted by both Alice and Bob and visible to
both of them.
Lines 4 through 13 deﬁne a method commit that Alice
uses to commit to the integer value v. Bob does not need
to trust v because he does not care how Alice computes the
value she commits to. The endorse operation makes that
policy decision explicit—it boosts the integrity of the value
of v so that it can be assigned to bid. The authority clause
in line 5 gives the method Bob’s authority, which is needed
by the endorse operation. In lines 4 and 14, the label after
the method name is a start label, used to control the implicit
ﬂow into the method [29].
Lines 14 through 20 deﬁne a method reveal that is used
by Alice to reveal the committed bid to Bob. It returns the
value of ﬁeld bid if the value of isCommitted is true. If
the value of isCommitted is false, it means that Alice has
not committed a value yet, and reveal simply returns -1.
Because Alice owns bid, releasing the data requires declas-
siﬁcation and hence Alice’s authority (declared at line 15)
so that it can declassify Alice’s data.
As shown in the example program, most security anno-
tations that a programmer needs to specify are in method
signatures. In general, programmers do not need to specify
labels for local variables because they can be inferred auto-
matically [29]. Usually, there are fewer security annotations
in a program than type annotations, so writing down secu-
rity annotations is not a much heavier burden than writing
down the type annotations that programmers are used to.
2.5 Trust model and security assurance
Clearly, any secure distributed system relies on the trust-
worthiness of the underlying infrastructure. Let H be a
set of known hosts, among which the program is to be dis-
tributed. We assume that pairwise communication between
two members of H is authenticated, reliable, in-order, and
cannot be intercepted or forged. Protection against intercep-
tion and forgery can be achieved efﬁciently through well-
known encryption techniques (e.g, [46, 58]).
To partition a program securely, the splitter must know
the trust relationships between the participating principals
and the hosts H . For example, if Alice declares that she
trusts a host to hold her conﬁdential data, the splitter can
allow her data to reside on that host. Moreover, her conﬁ-
dentiality policy should be obeyed unless some host trusted
by her suffers a malicious (Byzantine) failure, taking an ac-
tion that is inconsistent with the subprogram located on h.
Such an action might result from the subversion of h by
an attacker. Conversely, a host that simply stops or crashes
may cause the computation as a whole to halt, but should
not harm data conﬁdentiality or integrity.
Each host h has a security label that describes the trust
that principals place in h. The conﬁdentiality part of this
label, C(h), is an upper bound on the conﬁdentiality of in-
formation that can be sent securely to h. The integrity part
of the label, I(h), is an upper bound on the integrity of in-
formation that can be received securely from h; that is, the
set of principals that trust data from h. To authenticate a
host label, each principal p needs to sign the security poli-
cies in the label that are owned by p.
The trust conﬁguration is a map from all the hosts in H
to their corresponding security labels. The splitter uses pro-
gram labels and the trust conﬁguration to securely partition
a program. The partitioning must obey the constraint that
the host selected to run a subprogram has a label that de-
scribes enough protection of conﬁdentiality and integrity to
execute that subprogram. A secure partitioning must satisfy
the following security condition [61]:
Security Assurance: Suppose Hbad is the set of
compromised hosts in the system. Then the con-
ﬁdentiality of an expression e cannot be harmed
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unlessC(e) v A
h2HbadC(h); its integrity cannot
be harmed unlessB
h2HbadI(h) v I(e).
The intuition behind this condition is that the label of a
host is a bound on the damage that the host can do if it
is subverted. However, if multiple hosts are subverted, they
may collude to cause more damage. Therefore, the dam-
age caused by a set Hbad of compromised hosts should be
bounded by the join of their conﬁdentiality labels and the
meet of their integrity labels.
The security assurance condition is not always
easy to satisfy. Consider running the bid commit-
ment program on a trust conﬁguration in which host
h
a
’s label is {Alice:; *:Alice} and host h
b
’s is
{Bob:; Alice:Bob; *:Bob}. That is, h
a
is trusted by
Alice and can hold her private data, and h
b
is trusted by
Bob and can hold his private data as well as data Alice
reveals to him. However, the original Jif/split system [61]
cannot partition this code because the ﬁeld isCommitted
must be trusted by both Alice and Bob; therefore, the ﬁeld
cannot be placed on either h
a
or h
b
. This paper shows that
replication of code and data can often solve this problem,
which arises in realistic applications.
3 Partitioning and Replication
In this work the original secure program partitioning al-
gorithm has been extended to exploit automatic replication.
If there is no host with a sufﬁcient integrity label to run a
program statement or to store a ﬁeld, the extended splitter
can replicate the statement or the ﬁeld on multiple hosts to
satisfy integrity requirements.
Consider the partitioning failure described in Sec-
tion 2.5. Unlike the original splitter, our extended Jif/split
compiler can replicate the ﬁeld isCommitted onto both h
a
and h
b
, so that the ﬁeld’s value is considered valid only
when the copies on h
a
and h
b
agree. Alice trusts the
copy on h
a
and Bob trusts the copy on h
b
; therefore, if
both copies have the same value x, both Alice and Bob
trust that the ﬁeld isCommitted has the value x, as re-
quired by the ﬁeld’s integrity label, {*:Alice,Bob}. In
general, by replicating data on a set of hosts h
1
; : : : ; h
n
,
integrity may be increased up to the combined integrity
I(h
1
)u : : : u I(h
n
) if the replicas all agree.
The use of replication increases the ﬂexibility that the
splitter has to partition programs, but the same security as-
surance condition still applies. Suppose e is replicated on a
set of hosts h
i
where 1  i  n. The splitter ensures stati-
cally that the combined integrity of the hosts h
i
is sufﬁcient
to compute e, so B
i
I(h
i
) v I(e). The result of e can be
incorrect only if all the replicas of e produce the same incor-
rect result; if so, the hosts h
i
are all compromised, and we
have B
h2HbadI(h) v BiI(hi). By transitivity, the result
of e can be incorrect only when B
h2HbadI(h) v I(e), but
then the security assurance condition does not guarantee the
integrity of e.
Enforcing the integrity policies described here does not
guarantee availability; if any of the hosts performing a repli-
cated computation is compromised and produces a result in-
consistent with the results from other hosts, the error will be
detected and the computation will be halted. Better enforce-
ment of availability policies appears to be possible within
the secure partitioning framework, but is left to future work.
The rest of this section describes the replication and par-
titioning of classes and objects across a distributed system,
as well as the static constraints that determine where each
statement and each data item can be placed in the distributed
system. These constraints ensure that conﬁdentiality and in-
tegrity policies are enforced if all hosts compute correctly.
Misbehaving hosts are controlled by the run-time mecha-
nisms described in Section 4.
3.1 Splitting code, classes and objects
The splitter uses a ﬁne-grained approach to partitioning.
For each ﬁeld and statement, the splitter assigns a set of
hosts to it. Then statements and ﬁelds that can be placed
on the same host are assembled to form a subprogram. This
ﬁne-grained approach gives the splitter ﬂexibility in select-
ing hosts to satisfy the security constraints.
Like Java, Jif is an object-oriented language in which a
program consists of classes. The splitter partitions a class
into multiple local classes, each of which resides on one
host. A local class contains some ﬁelds of the original class
and stub code for calling class methods. If a class C is split
into local classes C
1
; : : : ; C
n
, then an object o of class C
is represented by a set of local objects o
1
; : : : ; o
n
that are
instances of the classes C
1
; : : : ; C
n
and located on hosts
h
1
; : : : ; h
n
. These local objects share the same global ob-
ject ID.
The code of each source method is split into code seg-
ments. A code segment corresponds to a fragment of a
source method and is identiﬁed by the source program point
pc at which the fragment begins. Each code segment is
replicated on a set of hosts; all the replicas simulate the
computation of the source fragment.
A running method has an activation record that is explic-
itly represented as an object in the partitioned target code.
Each activation record is partitioned into local frame ob-
jects that represent the part of the activation record that is
stored on their host. As with local objects, local frame ob-
jects that represent the same activation record also share the
same global frame ID.
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3.2 Selecting hosts for data
If a data item d is replicated on hosts h
1
; : : : ; h
n
, then
each h
i
must be trusted not to leak d to unauthorized read-
ers. This constraint is expressed as C(d) v C(h
i
) for all i,
or equivalently, as C(d) v B
i
C(h
i
).
The hosts holding d may receive access or update re-
quests for d from other hosts, and infer some information
about the control ﬂow. The splitter computes the conﬁ-
dentiality C
if
(d) of the implicit ﬂow to each data item
d: if d is accessed at a program point pc, the constraint
C(pc) v C
if
(d) is satisﬁed. The hosts h
i
must be trusted
to read the implicit ﬂow: C
if
(d) v B
i
C(h
i
).
The integrity of d is at most as high as the combined
integrity of the set of hosts storing it: B
i
I(h
i
) v I(d).
Thus, replicating d tends to make it easier to satisfy the
integrity constraint but harder to satisfy the conﬁdentiality
constraints: there is a tension between conﬁdentiality and
integrity. One way to resolve this tension is to store a se-
cure hash value of d on hosts that cannot read d. The user
of d can verify the real value of d against its hash value to
assure integrity. We refer to the hashed copies of a piece
of data as its hash replicas. Confounders are used to pro-
tect hash replicas against dictionary attacks, as described in
Section 4.4.1.
Suppose a host h holds a hash replica of d. While it
cannot determine the real value of d, it knows when d is
accessed. Therefore h must have a conﬁdentiality label at
least as high as C
if
(d). For hash replicas, there are three
constraints for placing d on hosts h
1
; : : : ; h
n
:
9
i
C(d) v C(h
i
)
C
if
(d) v C(h
1
)u : : : uC(h
n
)
I(h
1
)u : : : u I(h
n
) v I(d)
The ﬁrst constraint ensures that there exists at least one
host that can hold v’s real value. The second constraint en-
sures that the hosts holding the data are trusted to receive
the implicit ﬂows. The third says that collectively the set of
hosts satisfy d’s integrity requirement.
Consider the ﬁeld bid of Figure 1. It has
the label {Alice:; *:Alice,Bob}, and C
if
(bid) is
{Alice:Bob} because the value of isCommitted can be
inferred from the fact that bid is updated at line 9. Thus,
bid is replicated on h
a
and h
b
, and h
a
can hold its real
value while h
b
can only hold its hash. It is easy to check
that the three constraints are satisﬁed: C(bid) v C(h
a
),
C
if
(bid) v C(h
a
)uC(h
b
) and I(h
a
)u I(h
b
) v I(bid).
3.3 Selecting hosts for code
In general, the hosts running a statement need to read all
the inputs of the statement. However, knowing hash repli-
cas of some inputs is sufﬁcient for execution of some com-
mon statements such as assignments. Consider the state-
ment bid=endorse(v,{*:Alice, Bob}) in the bid com-
mitment example. This statement is translated into bid=v
and replicated on h
a
and h
b
. Since h
b
is not allowed to read
the real value of bid or v, it owns hash replicas of both bid
and v. To execute the statement, h
b
only needs to assign the
hash replica of v to the hash replica of bid—no computa-
tion that depends on the actual value of v takes place. Given
a statement s, let U
r
(s) be the set of inputs whose real val-
ues are needed in the computation of s, and let U
h
(s) be the
set of inputs whose hash replicas are sufﬁcient to carry out
s. Then C(s) = A
v2U
r
(s)
C(v).
The hosts running a statement s also need to have a com-
bined integrity at least as high as the integrity of any out-
put of s. Let D(s) be the set of locations s deﬁnes. Then
I(s) = B
l2D(s)
I(l). In general, hosts h
1
; : : : ; h
n
can ex-
ecute the statement s securely if the following three con-
straints are satisﬁed:
8
v
0
2U
h
(s)
9
i
C(v
0
) v C(h
i
)
C(s) v C(h
1
)u : : : uC(h
n
)
I(h
1
)u : : : u I(h
n
) v I(s)
The ﬁrst constraint guarantees that there exists at least one
host h
i
that can hold the real value of the input v0. The sec-
ond constraint requires that every host can read those inputs
whose real values are needed to execute s. The third con-
straint ensures that the set of hosts has a combined integrity
sufﬁcient for every output of s.
4 Run-time Mechanisms
As a partitioned program runs, code segments on differ-
ent hosts interact to simulate the control ﬂow and data ﬂow
of the source program as if it were running on a single ma-
chine. These interactions include control and data transfers
between hosts, both of which are supported by the run-time
system. Each call to the run-time system sends a message to
another host to trigger an action on that host, such as execut-
ing a code segment or accessing a ﬁeld. An important goal
of the run-time system is to prevent bad hosts from causing
integrity violations.
4.1 Run-time interface
Figure 2 shows the interface to the run-time system.
There are three operations for transferring data between
hosts. Calls to getField and setField access remote
ﬁelds, while forward transfers local variables between
frame objects on different hosts. The other three opera-
tions in the ﬁgure—rgoto, lgoto and sync—are used to
transfer control among the hosts. This run-time interface is
similar to that in the original Jif/split system [61], but its
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Val getField(Host h, Obj o, Field f)
void setField(Host h, Obj o, Field f, Val v)
void forward(Host h, FrameID f, Var var, Val v)
void rgoto(Host h, FrameID f, int pc)
void lgoto()
void sync(FrameID f, int pc)
Figure 2. Run-time interface
int bid;
boolean isCommitted;
sync(sr); 
rgoto(s1);
s0: entry
v = (v>=0)?v:0;
forward(hb,...,v);lgoto();
s1
rgoto(s2);
sr
if (!isCommitted){
  bid=v;
  isCommitted=true;
}
rgoto(s3);
s2
lgoto();
s3: exit
Host ha
lgoto, ta
rgoto
rgoto
rgoto, tasync
Hash bid;
boolean isCommitted;
sync(sr); 
rgoto(s1);
s0: entry
rgoto(s2);
sr
if (!isCommitted){
  bid=v;
  isCommitted=true;
}
rgoto(s3);
s2
lgoto();
s3: exit
Host hb
rgoto
rgoto
rgot
o, tb
sync
fwd
ta
ta
tb
tb
hash
lgoto, tb
Figure 3. Control ﬂow graph of the commitmethod
implementation is quite different because it may be used
concurrently by different replicas.
Both rgoto (“regular goto”) and lgoto (“linear goto”
[60]) operations transfer control to a code segment on a
remote host. Intuitively, rgoto is used to transfer control
from a code segment to another with equal or lower in-
tegrity1, while lgoto allows a code segment to transfer con-
trol to another code segment with higher integrity. Figure 3
shows the control-ﬂow graph of a possible splitting and
replication of the commitmethod in Figure 1, and illustrates
how rgoto, lgoto and sync are used to transfer control. In
Figure 3, the integrity labels of s
0
, s
1
and s
2
are respectively
{*:Alice,Bob}, {*:Alice} and {*:Alice,Bob}.
 rgoto(h; f; pc) invokes the code segment at pc on host
h, with frame object f . The hosts doing the rgoto
must have a combined integrity as high as that of the
code segment to be invoked. In Figure 3, s
0
transfers
control to s
1
with rgoto.
1The integrity label of a code segment s is the meet of the integrity
labels of all the statements in s.
 lgoto() transfers control from one code segment to
another with higher integrity. A capability mechanism
prevents a host from using an invalid lgoto to corrupt
a computation with higher integrity. In Figure 3, af-
ter running s
1
, host h
a
sends two lgoto requests to
invoke the two replicas of s
r
. Since the integrity of
h
a
is lower than that of s
r
, h
a
must present a capa-
bility for invoking s
r
. Unlike in the original Jif/split
system [61], the capability is a set of capability tokens
ft
a
; t
b
g. Each token is used to invoke a replica of s
r
.
 sync(f; pc) creates a capability token t that can be
used to invoke the code segment replica on the local
host with frame object f . In general, a sync opera-
tion is replicated on multiple hosts, and creates a set
of tokens. A capability token is a tuple hh; f; pc; uidi,
containing a host ID, a frame ID, a program counter,
and a unique 128-bit identiﬁer. The ﬁrst three compo-
nents specify the code segment to be invoked by the
token. The last component prevents forgery and en-
sures uniqueness with high probability. In Figure 3,
the replicas of s
0
do sync operations to collectively
generate the capability ft
a
; t
b
g.
4.2 Replication and run-time checks
Except for sync, all of the operations in the run-time in-
terface need to send a message to another host. This has two
security implications. First, the receiving host must protect
the conﬁdentiality of the message, and second, a message
cannot be trusted more than its sender.
Suppose a run-time call on host h sends a message m
to host h0 to invoke an action a. Let C(m) be the conﬁ-
dentiality of the information that is contained in m or can
be inferred from it, and let I(a) be the integrity required
to perform a. Then the system must enforce two security
constraints: C(m) v C(h0) and I(h) v I(a). The split-
ter statically ensures that C(m) v C(h0) when it gener-
ates the code for the run-time call. However, the condition
I(h) v I(a)must be checked at run time, because bad hosts
might fabricate messages.
The constraint I(h) v I(a) has an interesting interaction
with replication. Suppose a statement f=3 is replicated on
hosts h
1
and h
2
, and the ﬁeld f resides on host h0. On
executing the statement, both h
1
and h
2
send a setField
message to h0. Host h0 should update f if the combined
integrity of h
1
and h
2
is as high as that of f. Suppose h0
receives the setFieldmessage from h
1
ﬁrst and ﬁnds that
I(h
1
) 6v I(f). In that case, h0 suspends the request until the
same request is made by h
2
. Then, h0 accepts the request
after verifying that I(h
1
)u I(h
2
) v I(f). In general, if
h
1
; :::; h
n
request an action a, it can be performed securely
if the combined integrity of the hosts h
i
is sufﬁcient:
I(h
1
)u :::u I(h
n
) v I(a) (RC1)
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However, this condition is more restrictive than necessary.
In general, if hosts h
1
; : : : ; h
n
send messages to hosts
h
0
1
; : : : ; h
0
r
to invoke an action a, each h0
j
can securely do
a if the following condition holds:
I(h
1
)u :::u I(h
n
) v I(a)t I(h
0
j
) (RC2)
The action a is successfully performed only if all the hosts
h
0
j
perform it, implying that RC2 holds at all h0
j
. But
this implies B
i
I(h
i
) v I(a)tB
j
I(h
0
j
), which guarantees
that RC1 is satisﬁed because the splitter statically ensures
B
j
I(h
0
j
) v I(a). Therefore, it is safe to use RC2 in run-
time checks.
Suppose hosts h
1
; h
2
and h
3
want to update a ﬁeld f
that is replicated on hosts h0
1
and h0
2
. The integrity of f is
{*:Alice,Bob,Chuck}, and the integrity labels of the ﬁve
hosts are shown in the following ﬁgure. Using RC2, only
three messages are required:
h1 h2 h3
{*:Alice} {*:Bob} {*:Chuck}
h1' h2'
{*:Alice,Bob} {*:Chuck}
4.3 Control transfer mechanisms
Using the three run-time calls (rgoto, lgoto and sync)
as building blocks, the splitter generates the run-time proto-
col that simulates the control ﬂow of the source program. A
secure control transfer protocol must prevent low-integrity
hosts from affecting high-integrity control ﬂow. Otherwise,
a bad low-integrity host may compromise high-integrity
computation, leading to data corruption or improper declas-
siﬁcation of conﬁdential data.
The difﬁcult case is when the control needs to be trans-
ferred from a code segment s
1
to another segment s
2
with
higher integrity (I(s
1
) 6v I(s
2
)). This transfer is poten-
tially insecure, because the bad hosts may have sufﬁcient
integrity to invoke s
1
and cause control to be passed to s
2
even though they do not have enough integrity to invoke s
2
.
So s
1
must use an lgoto operation along with a set of ca-
pability tokens to invoke s
2
.
4.3.1 The lgoto protocol
Consider a simple control ﬂow s
0
! s
1
! s
2
, where s
0
and s
2
have higher integrity than s
1
. Control should go
from code segment s
0
to s
1
, and then to s
2
. Here, s
1
has
low integrity and cannot pass control to s
2
directly, but s
0
has sufﬁcient integrity to transfer control to s
2
. So when
s
0
passes control to s
1
, it gives s
1
a capability that permits
control to be returned to a segment s
r
containing the state-
ment rgoto(s
2
). The segment s
r
has the same integrity as
s
0
and resides on the same set of hosts. Intuitively, s
1
is like
a procedure call, and s
r
is the return address.
Suppose s
0
is replicated on hosts h
1
through h
n
. The
protocol works roughly like this: each replica of s
0
on h
i
does a sync operation to create a token t
i
for the replica
of s
r
on the same host. Then s
0
passes control and the
set of tokens t
1
; : : : ; t
n
to s
1
. After s
1
ﬁnishes running, it
returns control to s
r
with those tokens. Finally, s
r
runs and
transfers control to s
2
. Using the notation “s
0
! s
1
: m”
to represent sending a message m from s
0
to s
1
, we can
write the protocol as:
1. s
0
: sync(s
r
), creates t
1
; : : : ; t
n
2. s
0
! s
1
: rgoto, ht
1
; : : : ; t
n
i
3. s
1
! s
r
: lgoto, ht
1
; : : : ; t
n
i
4. s
r
! s
2
: rgoto
This description hides some complexity arising from
replication. In step 2, sending an rgoto request from s
0
to s
1
actually requires multiple network messages from the
hosts running s
0
to the hosts running s
1
. In step 3, if a
host running s
1
has the token t
i
, the host just sends t
i
along
with an lgoto request to h
i
. Figure 3 shows an example in
which s
0
and s
1
are replicated on two hosts.
This protocol handles a simple control transfer to and
from a low-integrity host; more complex control ﬂow can
always be reduced to occurrences of this simple case.
4.3.2 The rgoto protocol
Suppose code segment s
0
transfers control to segment s
1
with an rgoto, where s
0
is replicated on h
1
; :::; h
n
and s
1
is replicated on h0
1
; :::; h
0
m
. For each h0
j
, the splitter ﬁnds
the smallest subset of fh
1
; :::; h
n
g such that the combined
integrity of the subset of hosts is greater than or equal to
I(h
0
j
)t I(s
1
); every host in the subset sends an rgoto re-
quest to h0
j
. This protocol guarantees that the run-time
check of RC2 at each host h0
j
succeeds, and avoids unnec-
essary network communication.
4.3.3 Token management
Capability tokens allow low-integrity hosts to invoke high-
integrity code segments using lgoto, so it is critical to re-
strict the creation and propagation of these tokens. Suppose
that I is an arbitrary integrity label. A label I 0 is consid-
ered high-integrity if I 0 v I ; otherwise it is low-integrity.
To prevent misuse of capability tokens, the system must en-
force two security invariants for every integrity label I :
TI1 When control is in a high-integrity code seg-
ment, no set of hosts whose combined in-
tegrity is low has a complete set of tokens
for a high-integrity code segment.
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TI2 When control is in a low-integrity code seg-
ment, at most one complete set of tokens
for a high-integrity code segment is held by
any set of hosts whose combined integrity is
low.
TI1 prevents low-integrity hosts from starting a high-
integrity thread while one is already running. TI2 ensures
that once control is transferred to a low-integrity code seg-
ment, high-integrity control ﬂow can be resumed at only
one point. These two invariants leave low-integrity hosts
no choice but to follow the control ﬂow chosen by high-
integrity hosts.
In the control-transfer protocol, tokens are passed be-
tween hosts in two ways. First, tokens can be passed along
with lgoto requests, as shown in step 3 of the lgoto pro-
tocol. The run-time system of each host maintains an entry
table that records tokens created on that host and their cor-
responding code segments. When a host receives an lgoto
request with a token t, it checks the entry table. If t is in the
entry table, the host invokes the corresponding code seg-
ment, and deletes t from the entry table to prevent replay
attacks.
Second, tokens can be passed along with rgoto requests,
as shown in step 2 of the lgoto protocol. These tokens
can be used by the destination hosts to invoke a remote
code segment. The run-time system associates the tokens
received along with an rgoto request with the code seg-
ment invoked by the rgoto request. The tokens associated
with the running code segment are called the active token set
(ATS). For instance, in Figure 3, the ATS of s
1
is ft
a
; t
b
g.
Suppose host h is running code segment s. Depending on
what control transfer operations are performed by s, the run-
time system of hmanages the ATS of s in one of three ways:
 Case 1: lgoto. The ATS is used to return control
to some higher-integrity code segment. Recall that an
lgoto call does not have any arguments, because the
run-time system maintains the ATS.
 Case 2: rgoto. The ATS is distributed to the replicas
of the destination code segment along with the rgoto
request.
 Case 3: sync followed by rgoto. The sync call cre-
ates a new token t that corresponds to a code segment
s
r
, which should be the only return point for the fol-
lowing computations that has a lower integrity than s.
Token t is sent along with the rgoto request, and the
current ATS becomes associated with s
r
, so that it be-
comes the ATS when control returns.
There is an important security constraint about the dis-
tribution of tokens in case two. Suppose a set of hosts
use rgoto to transfer control to a code segment s repli-
cated on h0
1
; : : : ; h
0
m
, and distributes a set of tokens to each
of the replicas. Then any subset B of fh0
1
; : : : ; h
0
m
g with
I(B) 6v I(s) cannot receive the complete set of tokens.
This is a direct corollary of TI1, where high integrity and
low integrity are deﬁned with respect to I(s). If B receives
the complete set of tokens, then TI1 is violated: the control
is in a high-integrity code segment s, but B has a low com-
bined integrity label and holds a complete set of tokens for
a high-integrity code segment.
The run-time system enforces this constraint by ensuring
that each recipient gets at least one unique token. However,
the senders may not have enough tokens to assign a unique
one to each recipient. In that case, the run-time system splits
a token into multiple tokens by a secret-splitting scheme
based on the exclusive-or operation [42].
4.3.4 Control ﬂow assurance
The control ﬂow assurance that our control transfer mech-
anism is designed to enforce can be deﬁned using a trace
model. We represent an execution of a program as a trace
of code segments that are running sequentially. For exam-
ple, F = s
0
s
1
s
r
s
2
is a trace. Let bF c
I
represents the trace
obtained by removing fromF those code segments with low
integrity relative to I . Intuitively, bF c
I
should not be cor-
rupted by a set of bad hosts whose combined integrity is
lower than I . The control transfer mechanism is intended to
enforce the following property:
Control Flow Assurance Let F be the correct
trace of running a program, F 0 be the actual trace
of running the same program, andHbad be the set
of compromised hosts. Then B
h2Hbad
I(h) 6v I
implies bF 0c
I
is a preﬁx of bF c
I
.
Recall that bad hosts can potentially stop the computa-
tion. That is the reason why the condition states that bF 0c
I
is a preﬁx of bF c
I
instead of equal to bF c
I
. However, this
availability attack will not corrupt data or cause conﬁdential
data to be leaked.
Our control transfer mechanism ensures that low-
integrity hosts can only use capability tokens to invoke a
high-integrity code segment. Under this condition, the two
token invariants imply the control ﬂow assurance.
4.4 Data transfer mechanisms
Data transfer operations include accessing ﬁelds, updat-
ing ﬁelds, and forwarding local variables. To read a ﬁeld
f, a host h sends getField requests to a host set H
f
that
hold f and have a combined integrity as high as I(f)t I(h).
Each host in H
f
returns the value of f to h after checking
that C(f) v C(h). Then h compares the replicas of f from
H
f
, and accepts the value only if all the replicas are the
same.
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To update a ﬁeld f replicated on h0
1
through h0
n
, the up-
dating hosts send setField requests to each h0
i
, which do
the update after checking RC2. If a running code segment
updates a local variable, it has to forward the update to other
code segments residing on remote hosts that may use the
variable.
4.4.1 Data hashing
As described in Section 3.2, a secure hash value of data d
may be stored on a host h whose conﬁdentiality is only as
high as C
if
(d). The run-time system uses the MD5 algo-
rithm [36] to generate the hash. If host h wants to create a
hash of data d, it generates a confounder n and computes
fd; ngMD5. Whenever h sends d to some host, it also sends
n to that host so that the recipient can verify that fd; ngMD5
is the hash of d. If d is replicated on multiple hosts, those
hosts have to create the same confounder for d. The run-
time system uses the global identiﬁer generation algorithm
of Section 4.5 to generate shared confounders.
In Figure 3, the code segment s
1
contains a statement
v=(v>=0)?v:0 that deﬁnes v, and s
2
contains a statement
bid=v that uses v. After running s
1
, h
a
needs to forward the
value of v to the replica of s
2
on h
b
. Since h
b
cannot read v,
h
a
only sends the hash value of v to h
b
. It is interesting that
the usual way of implementing the bit commitment protocol
is to have Alice send a hash value of her committed bit to
Bob. The splitter automatically generates a similar protocol
from the high-level security policy.
4.4.2 Data consistency and synchronization
Several hosts may run the same piece of code or access the
same data concurrently. To maintain consistency, the run-
time system must ensure that those accesses are properly
ordered. Suppose a ﬁeld is replicated on a set of hosts.
It is important that each host processes the getField and
setField requests in the order speciﬁed by the source pro-
gram. However, requests are generated by replicated code
segments that need not be synchronized with one another.
A host should not serve a request until all logically previous
requests have been served. Timestamps are a common way
to accomplish this, but timestamps may leak conﬁdential in-
formation about control ﬂow. Instead, the hosts storing ﬁeld
replicas coordinate with each other using the following pro-
tocol.
A host receiving a new access request acts as the coordi-
nator of a two-phase commit protocol that ensures all other
replica hosts are aware of the request. It announces the ex-
istence of the request to the other replica hosts, which ac-
knowledge the announcement. Once all acknowledgements
have been received, the request is serviced by the coordina-
tor, and in parallel it informs the other replicas, permitting
them to begin servicing that request as well. Every host de-
lays servicing a ﬁeld request until it has served all pending
requests that it has acknowledged.
Some simple optimizations reduce the number of mes-
sages sent. A read request may be serviced if all pending
requests are also reads. In general several hosts may re-
ceive a new request concurrently and each try to act as co-
ordinator. However, coordinators are arbitrarily ordered and
a host stops participating in a run of this protocol once it be-
comes aware of a different run for the same request with a
lower-numbered coordinator. Finally, if there are only two
replicas, the ﬁnal step of the two-phase commit is skipped
because it is not necessary.
4.5 Global identiﬁer generation
Both object IDs and frame IDs are global and must be
generated consistently by replicated code segments. How-
ever, care must be taken to avoid creating a covert infor-
mation channel in which information about the control ﬂow
on trusted hosts is deducible from the global identiﬁer. In
our implementation, the covert channel is avoided by mak-
ing an identiﬁer appear random to hosts other than the cre-
ators. Every set of hosts that may create a global identi-
ﬁer share a secret confounder, which is used to generate
global identiﬁers independently and efﬁciently using MD5
hashing. The identiﬁers created with a confounder appear
random to hosts who do not know the confounder. At the
start of the program, hosts need to create global IDs run an
agreement protocol to initialize the confounder.
5 Results
The splitter and the necessary run-time support for exe-
cuting partitioned programs has been implemented in Java
as an extension to the existing Jif compiler [31].
5.1 Benchmark Programs
The system was evaluated with a set of programs that ex-
plored different kinds of distributed protocols and security
conﬁgurations; these programs were also compared with
hand-coded implementations.
Based on previous experience, communication cost is the
greatest contributor to execution time in a WAN environ-
ment. Since the distributed system will typically cross ad-
ministrative boundaries, we expect a WAN environment to
be the norm, and therefore report performance in terms of
the number of host-to-host messages generated.
The execution of the partitioned programs on differ-
ent hosts was simulated with multiple threads in a single
JVM, and the number of messages between hosts counted.
Each host’s subprogram was executed in a different thread.
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The hand-coded implementations were also run on multiple
threads in a single JVM.
The benchmark programs used were auctions, a banking
simulation, and the game Battleship. Replication of both
code and data was required to successfully partition these
programs with the trust conﬁgurations used. The programs
used are fairly short but contain the same security issues that
would be found in a more complete implementation.
In our most full-ﬂedged example, Battleship, there are
44 security annotations (labels), which is approximately 1
annotation for every 3 lines of code.
To summarize the results, the run-time performance of
the system on these programs was reasonable, and replica-
tion allows us to successfully partition programs for a larger
class of trust conﬁgurations.
5.1.1 Auctions
Auctions are a useful component of a number of elec-
tronic commerce interactions [21], for example electronic
procurement, where suppliers are bidding to fulﬁll a con-
tract. Participants in these interactions may have conﬁden-
tiality and trust requirements on the information used and
exchanged; various types of auctions, such as closed bid
auctions, incorporate aspects of privacy and trust. The di-
verse security requirements of different types of auctions,
and their relevance to electronic commerce, make auctions
an interesting and suitable problem area.
Three different types of auctions were modeled. All the
auctions modeled are one-sided, ﬁrst price auctions, with
only a single item for sale. The seller and the bidders are
identiﬁed with principals. Due to the single-threaded nature
of the programs, bids cannot be submitted asynchronously.
Instead, a round of bidding consists of each bidder in turn
submitting a bid.
The three auctions are named A
1
, A
2
and A
3
. Auction
A
1
is an open bid auction—all bids are public, and are en-
dorsed by all principals. At the close of the bidding, compu-
tation of the winning bidder is performed publicly. Auction
A
2
is a sealed bid auction, where bids are made public at
the close of bidding. Auction A
3
is similar to A
2
except that
bids are revealed only to the seller, who then determines the
winning bidder and reveals the result. The privacy and in-
tegrity requirements of each of these auctions are expressed
in their programs as labels and uses of downgrading.
5.1.2 Banking Simulation
Banking is an important distributed application with com-
plicated privacy and integrity requirements. We imple-
mented a simple banking example: Alice holds a credit-card
with a bank, and two credit report agencies maintain a credit
report for her. If Alice pays her credit-card bill late, the bank
reports this to the agencies, and then asks the agencies for
Alice’s credit rating. If the rating is too low, the bank may
cancel her line of credit.
We model Alice’s bank account information as being
owned by Alice, readable by the bank, and trusted by
both of them. For the bank to send a report to the agen-
cies thus requires an explicit declassiﬁcation of information
by Alice, which is presumably authorized by Alice when
she opens the account. Alice’s credit report has the label
{A:C1,C2;*:C1,C2}, where A represents Alice and C1 and
C2 represent the credit report agencies. To achieve the re-
quired security assurance, the code and data for the credit
report must be replicated on the hosts of both agencies.
5.1.3 Battleship Game
Battleship is a game for two players. Each player has a se-
cret grid containing several battleships. In turn, each player
asks the opponent to reveal the contents of a particular loca-
tion on the opponent’s grid. Play continues until one player
wins by discovering the location of all of his opponent’s
battleships.
This simple game has a number of interesting security
properties. Each principal (player) has a grid that is read-
able only by its owner, but to prevent cheating it must be
trusted by both principals. The principals alternate between
testing a single location of the opponent’s grid for a ship,
and declassifying that information. The control ﬂow of the
program must be trusted by both principals, to ensure that
turns alternate strictly and thus that no principal reveals too
much at once. At the end of the game, the unrevealed por-
tion of each principal’s grid is declassiﬁed, to verify that
both principals had the same number of battleships.
Many of the security issues that arise in this simple
game, such as preventing client cheating, are relevant to
more realistic online gaming systems. We speculate that
program partitioning may be useful for constructing secure
online games.
5.2 Performance
All the auction scenarios were run with three bidders. In
auctions A
1
and A
2
the seller plays no role in the bidding
process or in the computation of the winning bid, and is not
explicitly represented. The banking program BNK was run
with 4 principals, representing the bank customer, the bank
and two credit reporting agencies. The Battleship program
BTL was run with two principals on a 1010 grid.
Table 1 shows the trust conﬁgurations that were used for
the experiments. Each column shows the host labels occur-
ring in one conﬁguration. For the auctions, principals A, B,
and C are bidders and S represents the seller; for Banking,
principal A is the bank customer, B represents the bank, and
C1 and C2 represent credit reporting agencies; for Battle-
ship, principals A and B are the two players.
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Host Conﬁg X Conﬁg Y Conﬁg Z Conﬁg B Conﬁg W
h
1
{A:; *:A,B} {A:; S:A; *:A} {A:; S:; *:A} {A:B; *:B,C1,C2} {A:; *:A}
h
2
{B:; *:B,C} {B:; S:B; *:B} {B:; S:; *:B} {A:C1; *:C1} {B:; *:B}
h
3
{C:; *:C} {C:; S:C; *:C} {C:; S:; *:C} {A:C2; *:C2}  
h
4
  {S:; *:A,B,C,S} {S:; *:S}    
Table 1. Trust conﬁgurations for example programs.
Metric A
1
(hA
1
) A
2
(hA
2
) A
3
(hA
3Y
) A
3
(hA
3Z
) BNK(hBNK) BTL(hBTL)
Lines 49 (78) 54 (85) 62 (94) 62 (175) 53 (120) 142 (162)
Conﬁguration X X Y Z B W
Total messages 11 (4) 24 (8) 47 (9) 27 (18) 16(8) 1294 (383)
forward 1 7 9 9 4 1109
lgoto 2 2 9 0 2 0
rgoto 8 15 29 18 10 185
Table 2. Program measurements
The ﬁrst row of Table 2 gives the program lengths in lines
of code. We measured total message counts using conﬁgu-
ration X for A
1
and A
2
, conﬁgurations Y and Z for A
3
,
conﬁguration B for Banking and conﬁguration W for BTL
(as shown in the next row). The subsequent rows give total
message counts and a breakdown of counts by type for the
automatically partitioned program.
No setField or getField messages were sent during
any of the simulations—all ﬁeld accesses were local. The
splitter is often able to avoid setField and getField calls
because of the increased spatial locality of the data that re-
sults from replication: because ﬁelds are replicated on mul-
tiple hosts, a host can often access its local replicated copy,
instead of communicating with other hosts.
The results from the hand-coded implementations of the
example programs are shown in the table in parentheses
(hA
1
, hA
2
, hA
3Y
, hA
3Z
, hBNK and hBTL of Table 2). The
hand-coded implementations provide the same security as-
surance as the automatically partitioned programs, and ex-
plicitly replicate data and code to achieve the required in-
tegrity. The insight obtained by reading the corresponding
partitioned code helped in writing the reference implemen-
tations securely and efﬁciently.
All of the hand-coded implementations are longer
than the corresponding automatically partitioned programs.
Also, the hand-coded implementationswere written for spe-
ciﬁc trust conﬁgurations; hA
3Y
and hA
3Z
were both coded
from scratch, while A
3
was recompiled with different trust
conﬁgurations. In general, partitioning a program for dif-
ferent trust conﬁgurations is very easy; it is simply a matter
of recompilation.
The hand-coded implementations send 1.5–6 fewer
messages than the automatically partitioned programs. This
efﬁciency is possible because the hand-coded programs ex-
ploit concurrency to a greater degree than our automatically
partitioned programs. Our system must be conservative in
its use of concurrency to ensure that the security protocol of
a program—often implicit in the sequencing of execution—
is adhered to. For example, in the bid commitment program
of Figure 1 there is an implicit synchronization point after
the endorse statement of the commit method, to ensure
that Alice has really committed to a value before computa-
tion proceeds. Our system thus conservatively follows the
ﬂow of control of the source program, while the hand-coded
programs are free to rearrange control ﬂow so long as the se-
curity constraints are met. However, as program complex-
ity increases, writing secure concurrent code by hand, and
guaranteeing its security, can be difﬁcult. Our system trades
off some of the expressiveness and performance of hand-
written concurrent code for the assurance that the princi-
pals’ security policies are adhered to.
5.3 Discussion
If our new Jif/split system and the original Jif/split sys-
tem [61] are both able to successfully partition some pro-
gram given a trust conﬁguration, then the performance of
the two partitioned programs will be the same. However,
our system is able to successfully partition a given program
for a larger class of trust conﬁgurations than the original
Jif/split, which does not support replication. In fact, all pro-
grams that are compilable by the original Jif/split are com-
pilable in our system; none of the benchmark programs can
be compiled by the original Jif/split, as they all require repli-
cation.
For example, the players’ grids in the Battleship game
must be trusted by both principals, but since no host in
conﬁguration W is trusted by both principals, the original
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Jif/split would be unable to ﬁnd a host on which to store
either grid. Our system satisﬁes the security requirements
by replicating the grids on both hosts, though only in hash
value form on the opponent’s host.
6 Related Work
We have used the term “end-to-end security policies”
largely synonymously with “information ﬂow policies”. In-
formation ﬂow policies have been enforced using both dy-
namic [14, 25] and language-based techniques [9, 27, 28,
13, 53, 18, 34, 35, 3, 38]. Jif [29, 31] is a full-scale imple-
mentation of a security-typed language. This work builds
on the original Jif/split system [61] that introduced the se-
cure partitioning technique, extending it to support auto-
matic replication of code and data.
Although most research on information ﬂow has focused
on conﬁdentiality policies, integrity has also been stud-
ied [4, 32]. Security types that capture integrity have been
used to reason about the correctness of communications
protocols [17] and to ﬁnd format string vulnerabilities in
C [43]. Stack inspection [55] also protects integrity by en-
suring that privileged code is not invoked by untrusted par-
ties.
Fragment-Redundancy-Scattering (FRS) is a related de-
sign methodology in which programmers implement secure
applications by manually splitting and replicating their code
and data to achieve conﬁdentiality and integrity [51, 12].
Secure program partitioning differs in that programmers
write formal security policies into their applications that en-
able the system to automatically split and replicate code and
data in order to enforce a formally speciﬁed security condi-
tion.
Another language-based approach that uses code trans-
formation to enforce security policies is inline reference
monitors [10, 11]. Automated code transformation has
also been used to guard against buffer overﬂows [8] and
more generally, violations of memory safety [54]. How-
ever, none of these code-wrapping techniques can enforce
information-ﬂow policies [41].
Program slicing techniques [56, 50] provide information
about the data dependencies in a piece of software. Al-
though the use of backward slices to investigate integrity
and related security properties has been proposed [15, 22],
the focus of work on program slicing has been debugging
and understanding existing software.
7 Conclusions
End-to-end security assurance is a long-standing prob-
lem that is growing more important as computation be-
comes increasingly distributed, spanning organizational and
other trust boundaries. Information-ﬂow policies are a nat-
ural way to specify end-to-end security, but there has been
little prior investigation of how to practically specify and
enforce them in systems with mutual distrust and distrusted
hosts. Enforcement of data integrity policies is a central
problem that was identiﬁed in earlier work on secure pro-
gram partitioning [61] but not satisfactorily resolved.
This paper has described a way of exploiting redundancy
to improve integrity guarantees. The deﬁnition of security is
the same as in the original secure partitioning work: the se-
curity policies of a principal can be violated only if a trusted
host misbehaves, perhaps because of a successful attack. In
this work, we have shown that an extension to secure par-
titioning in which program code and data are replicated to
satisfy the security constraint. The results show that exam-
ples of useful secure distributed computation that could not
be supported by the original secure partitioning algorithms
can be successfully partitioned using replication.
Adding replication involves several nontrivial extensions
to the run-time protocols. Because conﬁdentiality and in-
tegrity can conﬂict, data may be replicated onto hosts us-
ing a one-way hash that permits integrity veriﬁcation with-
out violating conﬁdentiality. Untrusted hosts are prevented
from sabotaging the integrity of program control ﬂow by a
run-time protocol based on capabilities that are decomposed
into sets of unforgeable tokens. A synchronization protocol
prevents concurrently executing code segments from intro-
ducing inconsistencies.
One beneﬁt of programming in a security-typed lan-
guage is that programmers only need to specify high-level
security requirements, and the compiler can generate code
that actually fulﬁlls those security requirements. This pa-
per shows that the secure partitioning methodology can be
extended to improve support for data integrity. However,
there is much left to be done: for example, supporting true
concurrent programming, availability policies, and dynam-
ically varying principals and policies.
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